The Province of North Cotabato et al. v. The Government of
the Republic of the Philippines et al.
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, 14
October 2008
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The
Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating
that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue
peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity
in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the
use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations
on the substantive agenda are on-going.
When
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive
against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the
peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded
with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of
Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to
return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to
seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.
The
parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated
by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement
on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and
the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in
Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With
regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001
simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their
next meeting."
A second round of peace talks was held in
Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of
the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was
followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7,
2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence
between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held
between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the
draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last
August 5, 2008.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North
Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 183591, for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to
information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of
the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the
MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of
a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
This initial petition was followed by another one,
docketed as G.R. No. 183752,
also for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the City of
Zamboanga, Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico
Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners
herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro
Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the
MOA-AD be declared null and void.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public
respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the
MOA-AD. The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the
Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the
MOA-AD, to which she complied.
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan filed a petition
for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that
respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already
been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Governor
Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep.
Cesar Jalosjos, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 183951. They pray, inter
alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative
effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay,
and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition, docketed
as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment
prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and
executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar
thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal.
Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace
Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the petitions have become moot and academic?
2.
Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication?
3. Whether
or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of
public concern under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest including public?
4.
Whether or not, the provisions of MOA-AD establishes an associative
relationship with the Philippine Government and the BJE resulting to the latter
as a separate independent state or a juridical, territorial, political
subdivision not recognized by law?
5. Whether
or not the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution and laws?
6. Whether or not the MOA-AD is inconsistent with
the International laws?
7. Whether or not the MOA-AD is binding as an
international agreement?
8. Whether the Executive Branch has the authority
to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines with BJE?
Rulings:
1. No, the petition have not become moot and academic.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the
Court held that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds
that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation
is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
In this case, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the
eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present
petitions. The present petitions are not confined to the terms and
provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations
and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not,
therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of
the MOA-AD, the manifestation that it will not be
signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.Furthermore,
the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, as it involves a
significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political
modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court
to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the
public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly
the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the
Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon,
will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents'
actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form.
Henceforth, the petition have not become mot and academic.
2. Yes, the
constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication.
An actual
case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from
a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence. Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is
a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result
of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
act complained of. Also, the Court has the discretion to relax the procedural
technicality on locus standi,
where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues
raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance
deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
In this case, the petitions allege that
respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without
consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing
them of the proceedings. Such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under E.O. No. 3.Furthermore, the petitions allege that the
provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides
that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,"
implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This
stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to
the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. As the
petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating
their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and
statutes, the petitions make a prima
facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual
case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. Furthermore,
the petitioners have locus
standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as
LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be
included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they
did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form
the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt. Other
petitioners, invoked that the issue at hand where of undeniable transcendental
importance which the court has granted them locus standi.
Hence, the constitutionality and the legality of
the MOA is ripe for adjudication.
3. Yes, there is a violation of the people's right
to information on matters of public concern under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest including public
resulting to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel’s
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
negotiated and initiated the MOA.
Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights
provides that the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Also under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution provides that subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Furthermore, the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy
to "require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions" is well-taken.
In this case, the MOA-AD is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. It unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from
their total environment. As such, the MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing
ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut
mechanisms ordained in said Act, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary
and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty
and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
Hence, there is a violation of the people's right
to information on matters of public concern under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest including public
resulting to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel’s
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
negotiated and initiated the MOA.
4. Yes, the provisions of MOA-AD establishes an associative relationship with
the Philippine Government and the BJE resulting to the latter as a separate
independent state or a juridical, territorial, political subdivision not
recognized by law.
The court used the definition of Keitner and Reisman that an
association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily
establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the
other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state.
Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence. Also it bears noting that in international practice, free
association is understood as an international association between sovereigns.
In international practice, the "associated
state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former
colonies on their way to full independence. In the Philippines, the concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution
In this case, paragraph 4 under Governance in the
MOA-AD provides that The relationship
between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall
be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with
a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and
administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a
comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central
Government and the BJE. The provisions of the MOA which is consistent with the
international concept of association indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or,
at any rate, a status closely approximating it. It also implies the
recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does
it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence. BJE is a
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population,
a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states. As such, while there may be a semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national
government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a
status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.
The provisions in the MOA-AD indicates enough of BJE’s aim of being a separate
state from the Philippines.
Hence,
the provisions of MOA-AD establishes an associative relationship with the
Philippine Government and the BJE resulting to the latter as a separate
independent state or a juridical, territorial, political subdivision not
recognized by law.
5. Yes,
the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution and laws.
· Article
X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region."
In this
case, paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present
geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del
Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan
and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of
another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned
earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the
above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however,
does not render
another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what
these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
·
Art. X,
SECTION 20 of the constitution provides that within its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1)
Administrative organization;
(2)
Creation of sources of revenues;
(3)
Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4)
Personal, family, and property relations;
(5)
Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6)
Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7)
Educational policies;
(8) Preservation
and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as
may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people
of the region.
In this case, on the premise that
the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an
amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new
legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision
would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers
found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the
Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting
the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the
strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided,
however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression
against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines." Under our
constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power.
·
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution provides "The State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development."
In this
case, an associative arrangement
does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because
of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the
act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive
to national unity.
·
Article X, Section 3 of RA 9054 provides that "As used in this Organic
Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous
region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens
whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other
sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens
who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."
In this case, MOA-AD, paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles state
that: It is the birthright of all Moros and all
Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The
Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including
Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its
descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are
classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall
be respected. This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found
in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping
together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living
in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes
between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples.
·
Chapter
VIII of the IPRA lays down a detailed procedure for the delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains.
In this
case, The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro
people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory,
the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed
Schedules, "the Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the
land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains,
and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region."
Hence, the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the
Philippine Constitution and laws.
6. Yes, the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the
International laws.
Article 1 of both covenants, International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights state, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of
self-determination, "freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development." The people's
right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to
a unilateral right of secession.
In the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION, the Committee
stated the rule as follows:
In the absence of express provisions in
international treaties, the right
of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the
sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the
right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of
which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than
it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of
the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate
by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the
sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A
dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions
therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to the
domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned.
In the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of
indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous
peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights
recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for
any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally
or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States.
In this case, the MOA-AD
have provisions that would make the BJE a separate independent state from the
Philippines. As mentioned before, the act of placing a portion of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been
a preparation for independence,
is certainly not conducive to national unity.
Such provisions are not consistent to the Philippine Constitution and also to
international laws.
Hence, the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the
International laws.
7. No, the MOA-AD is not binding as an
international agreement.
The court used the ruling in the Lomé Accord
Amnesty (the Lomé Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, in
which the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only
create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law, not
in international law. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must
create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that a breach
of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will
also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lomé Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable of
being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the Lomé
Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a
factual situation of restoration of peace that the international community
acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not
convert it to an international agreement which creates an obligation
enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A peace agreement which settles
an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one
which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be
between two or more warring States. The Lomé Agreement cannot be characterized
as an international instrument.
Also in the Nuclear Test
Case, the ICJ ruled that when it is the intention of the State making the
declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that
intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the
State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct
consistent with the declaration. It can be gathered from the ruling of
ICJ that public
statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral
declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were
clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be
bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to
those statements would be detrimental to the security of international
intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar
circumstances.
In this case, the Philippine panel did not draft
the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international
community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were
States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the
negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as
witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lomé
Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the
peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international
organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized
so as to create obligations in international law. Since the commitments in the
MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such
commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse
- to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States. That the
Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it
had no intention to be bound to the international community. On that
ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered
a unilateral declaration under international law.
Hence, the MOA-AD is not binding as an
international agreement
8. No, the Executive Branch does not have the
authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines with
BJE.
The court ruled that the President's power to
conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief. The President may not, of course,
unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not
be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could
then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for
constitutional amendment and revision. The President - in the course of conducting
peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that
require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent
of that body were assumed as a certainty.
In this case the
"suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards. Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will
eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she
could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the
people, in whom constituent powers are vested. Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7
on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with
the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments,
it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the
"consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck
down as unconstitutional.
Hence, the Executive Branch does not have the
authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines with
BJE.