Facts:
In its Resolution No. 2847 dated
June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of
"Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules and
Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the
vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It
apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list
solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However,
for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and
proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of
38" private respondents.
The twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having
obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system,
objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only
parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the
votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of
Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should
be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in
proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by
said Section 11.
Comelec en Banc
Issue: Should the remaining 38 unfilled
seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified
parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2)
to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed
the two percent threshold?
Ruling by Comelec En Banc:
The poll body held that to
allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote
requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen
organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four
sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict
application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the
Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x."
Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with
the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to
compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
Result from Court en Banc decision:
Several petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary
restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this
Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent
of the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the suits, made
respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and
coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to
party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners
sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their
parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of
the total votes cast for the party-list system.
Supreme Court
Issue:
1. Does the Constitution require all
such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances?
2.(a) Are the two percent threshold
requirement; and
(b) the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in
the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?
Ruling:
1. No,
the Constitution does not require
all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances.
The
Art. VI, Sec. 5 of the Philippine Constitution provides that the party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. Furthermore, the Court ruled in this case
that Art. VI, Sec. 5 paragraph 2 is not mandatory but it merely provides a
ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
2. (a)
Yes, the two percent threshold requirement is constitutional.
The
Court ruled that the two
percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the
party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful
local representation.
In this case, the statutory
provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the
law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation
or circumvention.
Hence, the two percent threshold requirement is constitutional.
2. (b)
Yes, the
three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional.
The Court held Consistent with
the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition.
"Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such
three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would
dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
3. The Court determines the allocation of seats as follows:
Method of Allocating
Additional Seats
The Legal and Logical Formula for
the Philippines
It is now obvious that the
Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an
equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution
to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled
to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the
Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of
all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to
their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated,
is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the
above-mentioned parameters
After careful deliberation, we
now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among
the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members
of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in
the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are
guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of
votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to
determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue
of its obtaining the most number of votes.
The only basis given by the law
is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be
entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice
the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the
latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the
number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number
of votes
of first party
Total
votes for
party-list system |
=
|
Proportion
of votes of
first party relative to total votes for party-list system |
If the proportion of votes
received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the
first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats
overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or
greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party
shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is
less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.
Step Three. The next step is to
solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed
by the following complex fraction:
Additional
seats
for concerned party |
=
|
No. of
votes of
concerned party
No. of
votes of
first party |
x
|
No. of
additional
seats allocated to the first party |
The net result of the foregoing formula for
determining additional seats happily coincides with the present number of
incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve
other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of
their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.
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