David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Full text: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/may2006/gr_171396_2006.html

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

She cited the following facts as bases:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State – by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.

According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."

Issue:

WON PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees?

Ruling:

Yes, PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees.

Section 17, Article VII which reads

:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Furthermore, the President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following:

Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.

Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.

Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

And lastly, Section 1, Article VI states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

In this case, President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Hence, PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees.

KMU v. Director General, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_167798_2006.html

Facts:

EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005. Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.

Issue:

WON that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government?

Ruling:

No, EO 420 is not unconstitutional because it does constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government.

The Court held that, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." Furthermore, Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them.

In this case, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power – the President’s constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.

Hence, EO 420 is not unconstitutional because it does constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government.

Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009

Full text: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html

Facts:

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, the Court held:

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

Issue:

1. Whether or not HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases?

2. WON the irregularity of the Limkaichong’s proclamation will prevent HRET from acquiring jurisdiction?

Ruling:

1. Yes, HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.

In this case, Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007.She took all the necessary elements to become a Member of the House of Representatives. As such, HRET will be the sole judge of the qualification complaints against her.

Hence, HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

2. No, the irregularity of the Limkaichong’s proclamation will not prevent HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.

Jurisprudence teaches that in an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.

In the case at bar, Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Even if there is an alleged irregularity in her proclamation, she still has validly assumed office. As such HRET will have jurisdiction over any qualification complaints.

Hence, the irregularity of the Limkaichong’s proclamation will not prevent HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.

Veteran’s Federation v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 13678, October 26, 2010

Facts: 

In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of 38" private respondents.

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.

Comelec en Banc

Issue: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?

Ruling by Comelec En Banc:

The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives."

Result from Court en Banc decision:

Several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

Supreme Court

Issue:

1. Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all  circumstances?

2.(a) Are the two percent threshold requirement; and 

   (b) the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Ruling:

1. No, the Constitution does not require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances.

The Art. VI, Sec. 5 of the Philippine Constitution provides that the party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. Furthermore, the Court ruled in this case that Art. VI, Sec. 5 paragraph 2 is not mandatory but it merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

2. (a) Yes, the two percent threshold requirement is constitutional.

The Court ruled that the two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

In this case, the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.

Hence, the two percent threshold requirement is constitutional.

2. (b) Yes, the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

The Court held Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

3. The Court determines the allocation of seats as follows: 

Method of Allocating Additional Seats

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.

As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes of first party Total votes for party-list system

=

Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:

Additional seats for concerned party

=

No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of first party

x

No. of additional seats allocated to the first party

The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.